Architecturewriter

On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana. The storm caused catastrophic flooding in New Orleans as the flood protection system failed. Nearly all residents evacuated, not all returned. The recovery was complicated by disparate planning attempts. In 2019 TOPOS published my series on snapshots of the city, slightly edited for this presentation.        Lower Ninth Ward floodwall. Kammerbauer, 2017 New Orleans, the „Crescent City“, the „Sliver by the River“: on August 29th Hurricane Katrina triggered a catastrophic disaster in the city, followed by a dysfunctional response and a flawed recovery. Before Katrina, New Orleans was already scarred by racial inequality and social vulnerability that can be retraced within the urban fabric, indicating who lives in which neighborhood and why. The flood evacuation and resulting nationwide diaspora led to a dramatic decline in the number of residents. Eventually the city reached 90 percent of its pre-Katrin...

Katrina at 20: The failure of initiative in Katrina's wake was also due to the dysfunctional response on the part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Today, there is even talk of dismantling FEMA completely. The performance of the agency is related to the performance of responsible actors. Under James Lee Witt, FEMA performed exceptionally well, under Michael D. Brown, the agency failed abysmally. This is why research is important: it can analyze and reflect on the institution's activity in disaster management. An international comparison offers further context. I compared the US, Australia, Germany, and the Philippines and their institutions and recovery plans for a publication of the German Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBSR). On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana. The storm caused catastrophic flooding in New Orleans as the flood protection system failed. Nearly all residents evacuated, not all returned. The rec...

Katrina at 20: Evacuation is a common strategy to protect populations from the impact of disasters. This was also true in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. The big problem was that evacuation was contingent on car ownership, leading to highly stressful post-landfall search-and-rescue and evacuation procedures. And while many long-term evacuees eventually found a new home and a new job in cities they were displaced to, Houston being the most significant destination, the process raises serious planning questions. In particular, vulnerable New Orleanians were left with little to no choice regarding their displacement. Is it possible to "design" such a process, by giving people a choice which way forward they prefer once they have been evacuated to safe havens in the surrounding region? My contribution on "Schismourbanism as Design" was published in Yana Milev's extensive edited volume "Design Anthropology". On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made lan...

Katrina at 20: For German architecture magazine BAUWELT, I reviewed the situation in New Orleans ten years after the storm. Despite the difficult recovery, the hurricane inspired new approaches to environmentally sound urban planning ("Dutch Dialogs") and corresponding water-sensitive planning projects in the city (the Urban Water Plan and the Mirabeau Water Gardens). Figurehead of these initiatives is the office of Waggonner & Ball Architects. I had the opportunity to speak with David Waggonner in person and remotely on the firm's inspiring projects aimed at living with, and not against the water. On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana. The storm caused catastrophic flooding in New Orleans as the flood protection system failed. Nearly all residents evacuated, not all returned. The recovery was complicated by disparate planning attempts.

Katrina at 20: On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana. The storm caused catastrophic flooding in New Orleans as the flood protection system failed. Nearly all residents evacuated, not all returned. The recovery was complicated by disparate planning attempts. For an edition of PLANERIN focused on resilience and crisis, I compared the displacement of New Orleanians to Houston to the displacement of Ukrainians from R*ssian-occupied territories to Kharkiv. Actors in Houston and Kharkiv proactively planned for vulnerable displaced individuals and families. In the first case, vacant housing was made available despite the objections of FEMA (the US Federal Emergency Management Agency) against transfering evacuees from shelters to available apartments. In the second case, GIZ (the German Agency for International Cooperation) and the Kharkiv municipality cooperated in the provision of temporary housing clusters complete with social services.

Katrina at 20: In 2009 I had the opportunity to visit New Orleans for the second time. The hurricane had hit the city four years earlier. In the Lower Ninth Ward, rebuilding initiatives supported residents in their recovery efforts. I interviewed individuals active in institutions or civil society organizations who played roles in the citywide post-disaster recovery process. One interview I remember in particular took place in a Bywater café with Rick Prose and Laura Paul, representatives from lowernine.org – and the organization is still active today. They still conduct rehabilitation work with volunteers. In fact, they repaired a house built by another initiative, Make It Right. In the course of the Coronavirus pandemic, they provided food security to residents. 20 years after landfall of Hurricane Katrina, the work of lowernine.org takes place in the broader context of community development. Here's a shoutout to the nonprofit organizations that helped New Orleanians return and r...

Katrina at 20: In the context of urban climate risks, it is important to acknowledge that urban planning and emergency management planning and preparedness are two different planning domains. The related institutions are more often than not staffed by professionals from completely different academic backgrounds. The first relates to everyday planning in cities with the aim of achieving sustainability and resilience, against the background of uneven development and differential access to resources that cities offer. The second encompasses planning for urban disaster recovery and reconstruction in order to facilitate rebuilding efforts after a storm, a flood, an earthquake or another kind of natural hazard caused destruction of the built fabric. One of the lessons learned in the second case is that a return to "normal" or a condition that (presumably) existed prior to the impact of disaster is inadequate to make cities and their citizens resilient against future disasters. The ...