Architecturewriter

On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana. The storm caused catastrophic flooding in New Orleans as the flood protection system failed. Nearly all residents evacuated, not all returned. The recovery was complicated by disparate planning attempts. In 2019 TOPOS published my series on snapshots of the city, slightly edited for this presentation.        Lower Ninth Ward floodwall. Kammerbauer, 2017 New Orleans, the „Crescent City“, the „Sliver by the River“: on August 29th Hurricane Katrina triggered a catastrophic disaster in the city, followed by a dysfunctional response and a flawed recovery. Before Katrina, New Orleans was already scarred by racial inequality and social vulnerability that can be retraced within the urban fabric, indicating who lives in which neighborhood and why. The flood evacuation and resulting nationwide diaspora led to a dramatic decline in the number of residents. Eventually the city reached 90 percent of its pre-Katrin...

Katrina at 20: Evacuation is a common strategy to protect populations from the impact of disasters. This was also true in New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina. The big problem was that evacuation was contingent on car ownership, leading to highly stressful post-landfall search-and-rescue and evacuation procedures. And while many long-term evacuees eventually found a new home and a new job in cities they were displaced to, Houston being the most significant destination, the process raises serious planning questions. In particular, vulnerable New Orleanians were left with little to no choice regarding their displacement. Is it possible to "design" such a process, by giving people a choice which way forward they prefer once they have been evacuated to safe havens in the surrounding region? My contribution on "Schismourbanism as Design" was published in Yana Milev's extensive edited volume "Design Anthropology". On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made lan...

Katrina at 20: For German architecture magazine BAUWELT, I reviewed the situation in New Orleans ten years after the storm. Despite the difficult recovery, the hurricane inspired new approaches to environmentally sound urban planning ("Dutch Dialogs") and corresponding water-sensitive planning projects in the city (the Urban Water Plan and the Mirabeau Water Gardens). Figurehead of these initiatives is the office of Waggonner & Ball Architects. I had the opportunity to speak with David Waggonner in person and remotely on the firm's inspiring projects aimed at living with, and not against the water. On 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Louisiana. The storm caused catastrophic flooding in New Orleans as the flood protection system failed. Nearly all residents evacuated, not all returned. The recovery was complicated by disparate planning attempts.

Katrina at 20: In the context of urban climate risks, it is important to acknowledge that urban planning and emergency management planning and preparedness are two different planning domains. The related institutions are more often than not staffed by professionals from completely different academic backgrounds. The first relates to everyday planning in cities with the aim of achieving sustainability and resilience, against the background of uneven development and differential access to resources that cities offer. The second encompasses planning for urban disaster recovery and reconstruction in order to facilitate rebuilding efforts after a storm, a flood, an earthquake or another kind of natural hazard caused destruction of the built fabric. One of the lessons learned in the second case is that a return to "normal" or a condition that (presumably) existed prior to the impact of disaster is inadequate to make cities and their citizens resilient against future disasters. The ...

One recovery planning aim in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina would have been simple – for the Road Home program to prioritize the rebuilding of small rental properties, thereby recreating multiple residential units at once, which would have allowed many more residents evacuated to distant locations to return and rebuild their homes without needing FEMA trailers, which never materialized in sufficient quantities anyway. Why didn't rebuilding the city after the storm happen that way? Why the obsession with single family home construction in a city with such a high share of renters before the storm? "Early on 29 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina made landfall and resulted in the failure of the city’s flood protection system, the submergence of urbanized areas in floodwater, environmental problems through debris, contamination, and accelerated coastal erosion, and the death of almost 2,000 people. The city was confronted with “severe but not catastrophic winds, record rainfa...

Katrina at 20: In 2012 I was awarded a doctorate at the Bauhaus University Weimar for my research on planning in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. After identifying the reasons why residents couldn't return and rebuild following evacuation, I concluded that the focus on single family homeownership during the reconstruction phase led to a recovery bottleneck particularly among vulnerable populations – African Americans who owned properties of low value or were renters. Property value was the determinant for how much funding homeowners would receive from the Road Home program. And the focus on single family residences didn't solve the problem where prospective returnees would live during their individual rebuilding process. My proposal was to focus on small rental properties as pilot projects of recovery. They were common in the city before Katrina, fit into neighborhoods of various density, and would allow multiple returnees a place to stay before their actual h...

Nearly 20 years ago, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans. Ten years later, I had been researching the outcomes for some time and published "Adaptive strategies of urban disaster recovery planning" as a book chapter in a volume titled "Cities at Risk", edited by G. Sands, P. Filion, and M. Skidmore. Around the same time, I was interviewed by a committee of very high-ranking German academics on the topic and one of them suggested that there had been no planning at all in New Orleans. Based on my research I was necessitated to politely disagree, and explained why – which actually caused agitation in my interviewer. The book chapter shows that the problem wasn't the absence of planning, but instead, its ad-hoc character and the circumstance that it neglected the situation in the city before Katrina – shrinkage, inequality, uneven development, and vulnerability. So, what does the book chapter say? When disaster impacts cities, planners are required to address tw...

One of the most unexpected things that developed in the course of my research on environmental change and cities was that I started analyzing how insurance facilitates adaptation – or fails to do so. Together with my research partners, I published my results based on various case studies. State institutions or private market corporations can provide insurance against natural hazards, they can offer incentives for adaptation (cf. through the NFIP provided by FEMA in the USA), and they sometimes demand that their insurance holders rebuild the status quo ante (cf. Ahrtal, Germany). The latter neither reduces risk nor vulnerability, both key tenets of the Sendai Framework. Now, a Member of the Board of Management of German insurance company Allianz SE posted a startling article at Linkedin on the possible impact of climate change not only on insurance companies, but the entire global economic system. In the article, the alternative to reducing or avoiding climate impacts, i.e. "busine...

Wildfires in California, again. Posting my 2020 article for TOPOS on conflicting issues of urban development and disaster management and how to live with "mutating" disasters for your perusal here.

Sometimes you get invited to contribute research and then it nevers gets printed. However, this blog is the proper place to present such examples. Here is a text about interrelations between music and cities from an urbanistic viewpoint, with Los Angeles and Slayer as examples.  Lost Angeles: Slayer's Hell Urbanism Author: Mark Kammerbauer Publication details: unpublished manuscript, 2024 1. Introduction: The city as mirage of counter-culture The music, lyrics and visuals created by bands can be indicative of the urban life their members experience. Their work can be seen as a form of dialogue between the music cultures they participate in and the urban spaces they inhabit. This dialogue establishes an interrelation between the musician's city of reality and the music's city of imagination. Perceived this way, music becomes a medium of alternative visions of the city or audible utopias and dystopias. The question this perception raises is: What kind of imaginary city do mus...